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FOREWORD
A constant theme throughout the history of the U.S. has been the growth of the middle class and the
promise of its growth for the elimination of poverty. By the late 1980s, social analysts sensed a decline in the
size of the American middle class which later was verified through cross-section analysis of wage and salary
and income distribution data. Using time series from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for prime-age
males, this study moves beyond verification of the shrinking of the middle class. The analysis examines
changes in both income and wealth and finds that wealth increases reinforced income changes at the upper
end of the distribution while for low-income households, real earnings have stagnated. The analysis also
finds that demographics and cyclical factors account for little of the shrinkage of the middle class, although,
cyclical factors in the late 1980s reduced the upward mobility of lower-income households and increased the
downward mobility of many in the lower range of the middle of the income distribution. This coupled with
the gains to upper income households generated by the 1986 Federal Tax Reform enlarged the number of
households at both ends of the income distribution at the expense of the middle class. Moreover, the authors
find that prime-age adults who began the 1980s in the middle-income category had a greater probability of
falling to the lower class than of rising to the upper class.
This paper is the first in a series on Income Security Policy studies, which is the newest emphasis of
the Metropolitan Studies Program. The focus of these studies is on human resource issues, particularly those
related to income security vulnerability, poverty, income inequality, and the role played by the public sector in
addressing these issues. This research includes the risks of substantial drops in economic well-being caused
by labor market events--unemployment, retirement, disability, etc.--and by changes in household
composition--divorce, death of a spouse, birth of a chid, etc.
A major ongoing effort in this area compares the risks to economic well-being of the aged in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Related research concentrates on cross-national analysis
of income and economic well-being based on over 40 household income datasets from 18 nations. These
studies are financed by a number of organizations including the National Science Foundation, National
Institute on Aging, Russell Sage Foundation, and The Ford Foundation.
The research reported in this paper was sponsored in part by the Jerome Levy Institute at Bard
College and in part by the National Science Foundation. The authors are, respectively, Senior Research
Scientist, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor; Professor of Economics and
Public Administration, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University; and Research Scientist, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.
The authors would like to thank William T. Dickens, Jerry Evensky, James Follain, Peter Gottschalk,
Katherine Newman, Isaac Shapiro, and Dorothy Duncan for helpful comments and Deborah Laren and Naomi
Sealand for research assistance. However, the authors retain responsibility for all errors of omission and
commission.
David Greytak, Director
Metropolitan Studies Program
February 1992

W(H)ITHER THE MIDDLE CLASS?
A DYNAMIC VIEW

Introduction

Increasing political attention is being paid to the status of middle-income or middle-class
Americans. One of the major reasons for this increased attention is the results of research using
cross-sectional survey "snapshots" of household income taken over the past quarter century which
reveal a growing inequality in the distribution of annual money income of households in the
United States (Thurow, 1987; Levy, 1987; Levy and Michel, 1991; Michel, 1991; Karoly, 1990;
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1990; Easterlin, MacDonald and Macunovich, 1990).
This research has prompted some to argue that the U.S. middle class is shrinking (Phillips, 1990;
Bradbury, 1986). Aggregate data from the National Accounts and from wealth surveys (Wolff,
1989; Eargle, 1991) reinforce this conclusion by showing a growing share of income from capital,
a falling share for earnings, and a slightly increasing concentration of wealth among upper-income
groups. Also well-documented is greater inequality in the size distribution of earnings and wages
in the late 1980s as compared to one or two decades before (Gottschalk and Danziger, 1989;
Burtless, 1989; Blackburn et al., 1991).
While these results create a consistent story, their almost universal reliance on data drawn
from cross-sectional surveys leaves unanswered many important questions regarding the nature of
the changes taking place in the distribution of income and wealth. Most importantly,
cross-sectional snapshots provide information only on net changes in economic position and, thus,
reveal little about the extent and nature of movement into and out of the middle class. For
example, net increases in the number of low- relative to middle-income households occur when
unfavorable transitions--families falling from middle- to low-income status--outnumber favorable
transitions involving movement into the ranks of the middle class by previously low-income
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households. Surely it is important to track these two flows separately. Are increasing numbers of
families "falling from grace," as Katherine Newman (1988) puts it? If so, who are they and what
events are linked to their income losses? Or is mobility into the middle class declining? And, if
so, does this affect in particular young families? What avenues for upward mobility are
disappearing? These are the types of questions we seek to address for adults crossing either the
lower or the upper boundary of the middle class.
A second set of issues we address involves linkages between changes in income and
changes in wealth. A recent Census Bureau study (Eargle, 1991) comparing population snapshots
in 1984 and 1988 found that the median net worth of the most affluent quintile of households
ranked by net worth increased by 14 percent, while overall median net worth declined slightly.
However, this kind of study cannot tell us whether the increase was due to gains made by those
moving into this quintile or gains made by those already among the richest fifth. Nor can it tell us
whether changes in household income are reinforced by changes in wealth. Although one would
expect such linkages, it still may be that many households apparently falling out of the ranks of the
affluent into the middle class at the same time enjoyed substantial increases in, say, housing or
stock-market wealth.
We address these issues by analyzing trends in the transitions of prime-age (25-54 years
old) adults into and out of the middle class using 22 years of data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). We begin by reviewing the methodology and measurement procedures that we
employ to define the middle class and transitions into and out of middle-class status. Next we
present our basic findings which, in fact, show a persistent "withering" of the middle class since
about 1980. We then search for clues as to who moved into and out of the middle-income groups
and the source of such changes. Because notions of "class" are usually based on measures of
wealth as well as income, we also investigate longitudinal changes in the wealth distribution in the
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1980s for these same individuals. Our findings on wealth reinforce those based on income. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of our findings.

Methodological Approach

Since we needed longitudinal data on income transitions in different periods of the recent
past, we used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a panel survey of U.S. households begun in
1968 by the Survey Research Center (Hill, 1991). By following all members of its original sample
households, the PSID provides (except for immigration and differential nonresponse) continuous
representation of the U.S. population through time.
Low-income families were initially oversampled, but weights have been developed to
adjust both for the differential initial sampling probabilities and for the differential nonresponse
that has occurred since the beginning of the study (Survey Research Center, 1984). Assuming
that differential nonresponse bias is eliminated through weighting, the adults in our PSID sample
provide continuous representation of adults in the U.S. population with the sole exception of
immigrants to the United States since 1968.
Our interest in middle-class transitions led us to focus on the prime-age population--men
and women age 25-50--in the first year of the five-year period over which income transitions are
observed (see below). The public discussion of the economic fate of the middle class generally
concerns "prime-age" adult Americans--individuals too young to have reached the conventional
age of early retirement (55) but old enough to be living independently from their parents (25),
thus, excising many of the life cycle movements up and down the distribution which are related to
age--e.g., leaving school or retiring.
Sociologists argue that the concept of middle class (and "class" in general) is based on far
more than just income (Jencks, 1991). While this is true, the many unanswered questions
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regarding household income justify focusing on this dimension. To avoid confusion, we hereafter
refer to our divisions of economic well-being as low, middle, and high income.
We gather information from annual interviews conducted from 1968 to 1989, which cover
income received in calendar years 1967 through 1988, as well as wealth reported in the 1984 and
1989 interviewing waves. Income transitions are defined over all possible periods of five
consecutive years observed in the data. 1 Each sample adult's "initial" household economic
position is defined by the two-year average household income (with and without adjustments for
family size) over the first two years of the five-year interval. A "final" position is defined by
household income averaged over the fourth and fifth years of the interval. Two-year averages are
used in order to provide a more reliable picture of change in economic status.

2

A transition

occurs if average income in the fourth and fifth years was different enough from average income
in the first two years to cross over one of the two thresholds that bound our middle-income
category.
Aside from using two-year accounting periods, we departed from the conventional
measurement of household income in two ways. First, since food stamp income is arguably
equivalent to cash income, we included the dollar value of food stamps as a component of
household income. Second, since taxes reduce a household's disposable income, we subtracted
estimates of federal income taxes and social security payroll taxes from each household's income.
Our search for upper and lower boundaries of "middle income" began with a review of
how several authors have defined the rich, affluent, well-to-do, upper class, etc., in recent studies
and the issue of whether to adjust income for needs (e.g., family size) or not (see the appendix).
Some adjust income for family size, others use income alone; some studies use after-tax income,
most use Census (pre-tax, post-transfer) money income; some studies define affluence relative to
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a percentile point in the distribution, others have an absolute dollar figure that is subsequently
adjusted for inflation using either the CPI-U or the revised CPI-UX1.
As detailed in the appendix, we developed two absolute measures of economic status, both
of which are based on after-tax household income, and set the lower boundary of middle income
at roughly the 20th percentile of the sample in the middle of our sample period and the upper
boundary at the 90th percentile. The first measure is post-tax household income not adjusted for
family size. The lower and upper boundaries are $18,500 and $55,000, respectively, in 1987
dollars and are applied to all years using the CPI-UX1 price index.
Our second measure of economic status adjusts income for family size by dividing income
by the U.S. poverty thresholds based on family size. The resulting "income-to-needs" ratio equals
1.0 for a household with income just equal to its poverty threshold (which in 1990 equaled
roughly $13,000 for a family of four), 2.0 for a family with an income of twice its poverty
threshold, etc. The lower and upper boundaries of middle income-to-needs are 2.0 and 6.0,
respectively.3 Because the basic patterns of income transitions appear similar for both measures,
we concentrate on transitions based on unadjusted income but note differences between the two
measures when they occur.
Wealth
Because notions of economic position and class depend on both long-term wealth and
income, we were also interested in questions surrounding the movement of income and wealth in
relation to each other. Do adults who move between income groups experience like changes in
wealth? Do families falling from middle-income status experience declines in net worth and/or
increases in debt, or are the wealth changes countervailing? While PSID wealth information is not
available in most years, we were able to compare income transitions between 1984-1985 and
1987-1988 with PSID measures of net worth (total nonpension assets minus debt) taken in 1984
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and repeated in 1989. Tax adjustments are not yet possible for all years of the income data, so we
base income transitions on Census pre-tax, post-transfer money income.

Snapshot Comparisons

We began by calibrating PSID data against the Census Bureau's Current Population
Survey (CPS), the major data source of previous studies. To do this, we treated the PSID as if it
were a series of cross-sections and compared pre-tax income from 1967-1986 of all PSID
households against published CPS data on the distribution of households with pre-tax incomes
near our low- and high-income boundaries--$15,000 and $50,000 in 1989 dollars. (The CPS does
not regularly record income or payroll taxes and has collected food stamp information regularly
only after 1979.) The two data sources show very similar trends in the middle-income group-both time series show a slow but steady decline in the fraction of middle-income households from
nearly 60 percent in the late 1960s to about 51 percent in the late 1980s (Figure 1). The simple
correlation coefficient (r) between the PSID and CPS time series on middle-income households is
quite high--.94.
Because the CPS consistently records less household income from its respondents than
does the PSID, the CPS sample tends to produce higher estimates of households with incomes
below $15,000 and lower proportions of households with incomes above $50,000. But here

TABLE 1
PERCENT OF ADULTS MAKING KEY INCOME TRANSITIONS
Period Effects
All Years

Before 1980

Cyclical Effects
1980 and After

Nonrecession Years

Recession Years a

High-Income Transitions
Percent of Middle-Income Individuals
Climbing Out
Percent of High-Income Individuals
Falling Out

6.7

6.3

7.5

6.9

6.2

29.7

31.1

27.1

28.5

31.8

33.6

35.5

30.4

35.0

32.3

7.0

6.2

8.5

6.2

8.5

Low-Income Transitions
Percent of Low-Income Individuals
Climbing Out
Percent of Middle-Income Individuals
Falling Out
a

Recession years are defined by five-year growth in Per Capita Real Disposable Personal Income. They include 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1981.

TABLE 2
THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MOVING INTO AND OUT OF MIDDLE-INCOME STATUS: PERCENT OF EACH TYPE
OF ADULT MAKING TRANSITIONS a
Transitions into High-Income Statusb

Transitions out of Low-Income Statusc

All

Before 1980

1980 and After

All

Married Individualsd

86

90

74

56

65

37

Other Men

8

5

13

14

12

20

Other Women

6

5

13

30

23

43

100

100

100

100

100

100

(766)

(514)

(252)

(1704)

(1261)

(443)

Total
(Unweighted number of transition)

Transitions out of High-Income Statusa

Before 1980

1980 and After

Transitions into Low-Income Statusc

Married Individualsd

77

79

74

49

50

48

Other Men

10

11

9

16

13

17

Other Women

13

10

17

35

37

31

(289)

(193)

(96)

(1240)

(828)

(412)

Unweighted Number of Transitions
a

Transitions and events are defined over five-year periods. The data covered 16 five-year periods, 1967-1971 through 1982-1986. The adult must be in the
age range 25-50 in the first year of the given period. Five of those periods, starting with that for 1978-1982, are defined as `1980 and After', while the other
eleven are defined as `Before 1980'.
b
Transitions into (out of) high-income status are defined as occurring when the person's post-tax and -transfer family income is less (more) than $55,000 (in
1987 dollars, using the CPI-UX1) in both the first and second years of the five-year period and greater than or equal to $55,000 in both the fourth and fifth years.
c
Transitions out of (into) low-income status are defined as occurring when the person's post-tax and post-transfer family income is less than or equal to
(greater than) $18,500 (in 1987 dollars) in both the first and second years of the five-year period and greater than $18,500 in both the fourth and fifth years.
d
The percent of transitions occurring to married couples is the sum of transitions experienced by husbands in the 25-50 age range and wives in the 25-50 age
range. The within-group distribution of events shown in the table is that for married couples where the husband was required to be age 25-50. Results for
couples where the wife was required to be age 25-50 were very similar.

TABLE 3
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN FAVORABLE
AND UNFAVORABLE INCOME TRANSITIONS
(in percents)
Favorable Transitions
Into High Income
Most Important
Income Componenta

Before 1980

1980 and After

Unfavorable Transitions

Out of Low Income

Before 1980

1980 and After

Out of High Income

Before 1980

1980 and After

Into Low Income

Before 1980

1980 and After

Men's Earnings

51

50

50

53

50

57

60

63

Women's Earnings

14

23

26

28

10

14

16

14

Income of Other Family Members

26

15

11

6

30

22

15

13

9

12

13

13

10

7

9

10

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Other Income/Mixed
Total

a

Income of other family members consists of earnings plus any asset income of these other members. Other Income/Mixed is the residual category from the family's total money
income.

TABLE 4
WEALTH INEQUALITY, 1984 AND 1989
Percent Change in
Net Worth

Change in
Net Worth

$ 8,162

55

$ 2,881

38,083

50,894

34

12,811

80th Percentile

117,478

175,537

49

58,059

90th Percentile

207,582

321,555

55

113,973

Difference 90th-20th

202,301

313,393

Net Wortha Distribution
20th Percentile
Median

Ratio 90th/20th

1984
Net Worth

1989
Net Worth

$ 5,281

39.3

39.4

a
Net Worth is defined as the sum of the value of housing equity, real estate, vehicles, farm/business, stocks,
savings/investment, and other assets, less other debt, inflated to 1987 dollars using the CPI-UX1.

TABLE 6
WEALTH AND SAVINGS, 1984 TO 1989 BY TWO-YEAR AVERAGE INCOME CLASS
FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN THOUSANDS OF 1987 DOLLARS
1984

1989

Mean Ratio of
Two Year Average Income
Class in 1984-1985 and 19871988

Low Income:

Median
Net
Worth

House
Equity/
Net Worth

Debt/
Two-Year
Average
Income

Change in
Median
Net Worth

Percent
Change in
Median
Net Worth

Percent of
Sample
(Unweighted n)

0.46

0.06

305.4

0.43

0.05

137.7

82

4.7 (139)

79.8

0.55

0.09

152.4

0.49

0.04

72.6

91

5.1 (148)

115.2

0.33a

0.05a

164.7

0.41a

0.10a

49.5

43

1.7 (49)

39.9
15.5
41.5

0.57
0.53
0.57

0.07
0.08
0.07

54.3
26.1
55.7

0.56
0.54
0.56

0.07
0.07
0.07

14.4
10.6
14.2

36
68
34

52.3 (1535)
10.9 (319)
40.9 (1216)

Remained Low Income
All
Black
Nonblack

3.7
0.4
7.3

0.17
0.14
0.18

0.05
0.03
0.06

3.1
0.5
6.3

0.25
0.27
0.24

0.08
0.10
0.07

-0.6
0.1
-1.0

-16
25
-14

23.1 (677)
15.2 (444)
7.4 (233)

Climbed Out of Low Income

7.6

0.19

0.10

18.1

0.37

0.08

10.5

138

7.4 (217)

Fell Into Low Income

22.6

0.41

0.07

12.6

0.43

0.08

-10.0

-44

5.6 (162)

All

35.4

0.46

0.07

46.7

0.48

0.07

11.3

32

100 (2929)

Climbed Into High Income
Fell From High Income

Middle Income:

Debt/
Two-Year
Average
Income

167.7

Remained High Income
High Income:

Median
Net Worth

House
Equity/
Net Worth

Mean Ratio of

Remained Middle Income
All
Black
Nonblack

Note: Data cover five-year periods and compare mean pre-tax income in 1984 and 1985 to mean pre-tax income in 1987 and 1988. The "high" income cutoff is $70,263. The "low" income cutoff
is $21,316. Incomes are inflated to 1987 dollars using the CPI-UX1. Net Worth is defined as the sum of the value of housing equity, real estate, vehicles, farm/business, stocks, savings/investment, and
other assets, less other debt.
a
Mean ratios of house equity to net worth and debt to two-year average income were calculated for all individuals between the 25th and 75th percentile of net worth in each group except "Fell From
High Income." Mean ratios in this group were calculated for all individuals.

TABLE 5
TRENDS IN INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY
Year
1984-1985
Position in Income
Distribution
20th Percentile

1967-1968 Income

1977-1978 Income

1987-1988

Incomea

Net Worthb

Incomea

Net Worthb

$17,819

$19,683

$20,399

$12,546

$21,871

$18,533

Median

26,888

30,371

36,125

36,954

39,879

48,974

90th Percentile

46,066

51,601

73,628

126,716

81,933

198,872

Difference 90th-20th

28,247

31,918

53,229

114,170

60,062

180,339

2.6

2.6

3.6

10.1

Ratio 90th/20th

3.8

10.7

a
Income is defined as post-tax, post-transfer family income in 1967-1968 and 1977-1978, and pre-tax, post-transfer income in 1984-1985 and 1987-1988, inflated to
1987 dollars using the CPI-UX1.
b
Net worth is defined as the sum of the value of housing equity, real estate, vehicles, farm/business, stocks, savings/investment, and other assets, less other debt.
Median values of net worth between the 10th and 30th percentile of income are given for the 20th percentile of income, 40th and 60th percentile for the median, and
80th and 100th percentile for the 90th percentile.

TABLE A-1
DEFINITIONS OF HIGH-INCOME STATUS IN OTHER STUDIES

Measure of Richness

Source

150 to 200 percent median; above 200 percent median

Kosters and Ross (1987)

top one-third of distribution (affluent)

Rainwater (1974)

disposable income-to-needs above 1.5 (well-to-do)

Coder, Smeeding, Rainwater (1989)

pre-tax income-to-needs above 9.0 (rich)

Danziger, Gottschalk, Smolensky (1989)

unadjusted money income $75 000 to $100 000
(moderately affluent); above $100 000 (very affluent)

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)

160 to 225 percent median (upper middle class); over
225 percent median (upper class)

Blackburn and Bloom (1986, 1987)

above $50 000 in 1984 dollars (high income)

Bradbury (1986)

variety of measures, adjusted and unadjusted especially
75th and 90th percentiles of income indexed relative to
the median

Horrigan and Haugen (1988); Karoly (1990)

FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LOW, MIDDLE AND HIGH INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN THE CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY (1967-1989) AND PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS (1967-1986)

Source: CPS Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 167; Trends in Income: 1947 to 1988, Table 1; Note:
1989 data to be added to final draft.

FIGURE 2
PROPORTION OF ADULTS LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH "MIDDLE" INCOME AND INCOME/
NEEDS IN THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS, 1967-1986

NOTE: Income data are post-tax, two-year averages.

FIGURE 3
PROPORTION OF ADULTS LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH "LOW" AND "HIGH" INCOME AND
INCOME/NEEDS IN THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS, 1967-1986

NOTE: Income data are post-tax, two-year averages.

FIGURE 4
TRANSITIONS INTO AND OUT OF MIDDLE INCOME

FIGURE 5
ADJUSTED FRACTIONS OF VARIOUS GROUPS MAKING FAVORABLE INCOME TRANSITIONS

FIGURE 6
ADJUSTED FRACTIONS OF VARIOUS GROUPS MAKING UNFAVORABLE INCOME TRANSITIONS
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Figure 1

8
again the trends--an uneven rise in the proportion of high-income households, an unstable but
essentially trendless time series on the proportion of households with low incomes, resulting in a
declining middle-income group--are quite similar in the two data series. Correlations between the
PSID and CPS time series are .93 for the lower boundary and .95 for the upper boundary of
middle income. Macroeconomic conditions account for much of the irregularity in the trends,
with recessions around 1970, in the mid-1970s and again in the early 1980s temporarily increasing
the proportion of low-income households and reducing that of high-income households. On
balance, it appears that the PSID and CPS data tell very similar cross-sectional stories. 4
Are There Fewer Middle-Income Households?
We next examined cross-sectional trends in the size of PSID income groups, using the
sample of 25- to 50-year-olds and our various adjustments to income. Figures 2 and 3 summarize
the results.
As with CPS trends, there appears to be an irregular but clearly discernible decline in the
proportion of prime-aged adults with household incomes in the middle (the solid line in Figure 2).
Thus, our various adjustments to income and restriction of the sample to prime-age adults
changes the basic CPS household-income story very little. However, unlike CPS trends, PSID
proportions of adults with size-adjusted incomes in the middle follow a rather different pattern
(the correlation between the PSID time series with and without family-size adjustments is only
.69), with the proportion in the middle income-to-needs category increasing markedly during most
of the 1970s and only then declining sharply.
Underlying the different trends is a sharp decline in family size in the late 1960s and early
1970s, coupled with nearly flat real income change, which reduced the number of low income-toneeds adults (Figure 3) and increased the ranks of middle-income adults (Figure 2)

9
Figure 2

10
Figure 3
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between 1967 and 1973. However, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, income changes
became nearly as important as changes in family size, making more nearly parallel to the trends for
the two income measures.
The middle-income group shrank from a peak of about 75 percent of the population in the
early 1970s and again in 1977-1978 to a trough of 65 percent around 1983. Our most recent
figures, for 1985-1886, show just slightly more than two-thirds of the population--67 percent--in
the middle-income category. If anything, the recent decline in the size of the middle income-toneeds group is slightly steeper; only about 65 percent of the prime-age adult population can be
termed "middle-income" by this measure of well-being, down from a peak of 75 percent less than
one decade before.
Whereas a family-size-driven decline in the low income-to-needs population accounted for
most of the rise in the middle-income share during the early 1970s, the declining middle-income
share in the late 1970s and, especially, during the 1980s resulted primarily from growth in the
high-income and high income-to-needs population. Between 1979-1980 and 1985-1986, the
proportion of high-income families grew by more than 50 percent--from about 8 to over 13
points. High income-to-needs grew by even more--from 10 percent in 1979-1980 to over 16
percent in 1986. To paraphrase Michel (1991, p. 201), the rising tide of economic growth in the
1980s appears to have lifted the yachts but not the tugboats or the rowboats.

Transitions

It appears that the fraction of adults with middle income, middle income-to-needs, and
perhaps a middle-class standard of living has withered. This is more pronounced when income is
adjusted for family size and is occasioned by a substantial increase in the number of adults living in
high-income households and unsteady growth in the number of low-income adults. Many
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questions remain unanswered about even the basic trends. What kinds of people are actually
crossing the middle-income boundaries? What events are linked to their income losses or gains?
How do periods of economic growth or recession affect flows across the income boundaries? To
address these questions, we investigate actual transitions across our income boundaries using
longitudinal data on our sample of adults.
The composition of a population's share of low-, middle-, and high-income households is
the product of offsetting flows across the middle-income boundaries. For example, growth in the
number of high- at the expense of middle-income adults could result from increasing numbers of
people making the transition from middle- to high-income status, decreasing numbers falling from
high- to middle-income status, or to varying degrees both types of charges.
The first column of Table 1 shows the prevalence of transitions involving the three income
groups. When averaged across all of the five-year observation windows afforded by the PSID's
sample period, some 6.7 percent of adults whose two-year average post-tax household income
was between $18,500 and $55,000 are found to have succeeded in garnering two-year average
income above $55,000 two years later. A much larger fraction--29.7 percent--of high-income
individuals typically fell into the middle-income group. (The much smaller relative size of the
high-income group translates these very unequal conditional transition probabilities into more
nearly equal, overall numbers of people making the offsetting flows across the upper-boundary
line.)
Consistent with abundant research on flows across the poverty line (Bane and Ellwood,
1986; Duncan, 1984), the third row of Table 1 shows that more than one-third of low-income
adults typically succeeded in making the transition over the $18,500 middle-
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income boundary, while 7.0 percent of middle-income adults typically fell below it. 5
The importance of both calendar year and macroeconomic conditions is evident in Table 1.
The second and third columns divide the transitions by whether the middle of the five-year
observation window was before 1980, while the fourth and fifth columns divide the sample
according to whether macroeconomic conditions (as measured by five-year trends in the U.S.
Department of Commerce's series on per capita personal disposable income) were favorable or
not. 6
Relative to the late 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s were clearly a period in which all four of
the transition probabilities tended to accelerate reductions in the size of the middle-income group.
A higher percentage of individuals climbed into high-income status while a smaller percent fell
out; a lower fraction of low-income individuals climbed into the middle class while a larger
fraction of middle-income adults fell into the low-income group. 7
Cyclical factors performed as expected with favorable transitions less prevalent and
unfavorable transitions more frequent in recession years. Cyclical and period effects had very
similar impacts on unfavorable transitions; period effects found in the 1980s were somewhat more
important than business-cycle effects for favorable transitions.
Perhaps the most sabent feature of these changing probabilities involves those adults who
were middle class at the beginning of the decade. During the 1970s, they forced roughly equal
chances of moving up or down from the middle class. During the 1980s however, their
probability of falling from middle income to lower income increased dramatically relative to their
probability of moving up to the high-income class. By the middle of the 1980s, a middle-class
adult's chances of moving down the distribution were 85 in 1000 as compared to a 75 in 1000
chance of moving up the income distribution. This subtle change in the balance of middle-class
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movements means that the middle class dreams of upward mobility which Levy (1984) wrote
about are becoming ever less dim and distant.

Explaining Transitions

The next step in our investigation of transitions into and out of middle-income status was
to see what demographic characteristics correlated most strongly with the transitions and whether
characteristics such as advanced schooling and older age that are known to have been more
favored in the labor market in the 1980s were also powerful in explaining household-incomebased transitions. We do this both with and without adjustments for the effects of business-cycle
and other demographic factors. We also present data on what components of income--earnings of
adult males, females, or other family members--figured most prominently in the transitions.
Who Moved?
Table 2 helps to set the stage by showing the distribution of transitions according to the
marital status of the adults undergoing the transitions and the calendar year in which they
occurred. 8 Our five-year observation windows complicate the classification of marital status
somewhat, since someone may have been married for only a portion of the five-year period. We
concentrate on just three groups of adults: husbands and wives living together throughout the
five-year period, all other men, and all other women.
Married couples dominate high-income transitions, particularly prior to the 1980s, when
they accounted for 90 percent of all transitions into high-income status and 79 percent of
transitions from high- to middle-income status. Married couples were less likely to be involved in
movements across the lower boundary of the middle-income category. Other men--mainly single
men living without children--and other women--both single women and
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women heading families--were unlikely to experience high-income transitions but more likely to
experience low-income transitions. In fact, these "other" women were the most likely group in
the 1980s to move from low- to middle-income status.
The dominance of married couples among high-income transitions and the importance of
unmarried women among low-income transitions is in large part a reflection of the fact that these
groups are most at risk of making those transitions. Whether actual rates of transition differ for
these and other demographic groups is the next question we address.
Demographic Correlates
A look at differential transition rates by schooling, race, household composition and age
produced few surprises. Favorable transitions--both for middle- to high-income and from low- to
middle-income status--were more frequent among adults with college educations and less frequent
among female-headed families and, especially, among blacks. The incidence of unfavorable
transitions was a mirror image: less frequent among the college-educated and more frequent
among female-headed families and blacks. Transitions into high-income status were somewhat
more prevalent among older adults while transitions from low- to middle-income status were
more prevalent among younger adults. Aside from the drift toward middle-income-reducing
transitions in the 1980s, these demographic patterns were quite similar both before and after
1980.
We performed a series of logistic regressions using each of our four transitions as a
dependent variable in order to isolate the net contribution of business-cycle, period and
demographic factors. Independent variables included schooling, race, household composition and
age, macroeconomic conditions as measured by trend in per capita disposable personal income,
and a set of dummy variables measuring each person's distance between his or her own initial
household income and the middle-income transition boundary line. 9
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We first combined all sample years and addressed the issue of whether the middle-incomewithering differences in transition rates after versus before 1980 could be explained by differences
in demographic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions or distance to the transition
boundaries.10 The answer was clearly negative, with the differences in all four regression-adjusted
transition rates before and after 1980 generally as large as the simple differences displayed in
Table 1.
We next ran regressions separately for the two periods before and after 1980 to gauge the
changing importance of demographic factors. As before, we controlled for macroeconomic
conditions as well as the gap between each person's household income and the income associated
with the transition line. Results for the most interesting demographic variables are summarized in
Figures 5 and 6. 11
For making the transition into high-income status, a college education was a significant
help, while being young (head of household under age 35) or black hurt (Figure 4). Blacks were
only half as likely as the sample average to move into high-income status in both periods, even
after adjusting for differences in schooling, family composition and the fact that the starting point
for the typical black is further away from the high-income boundary. Interestingly, the regressionadjusted probability of female heads moving into the high-income group was significantly higher
in the 1980s than before. (The unadjusted transition probabilities remained at a low 2 percent in
both periods.) A closer look at transitions involving these women after 1980 showed that most
were highly educated, young, and childless. Their transitions were generally due to the much
higher real earnings growth that such women experienced in the 1980s (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1990).
As already mentioned, transitions out of low-income status (shown in the right half of
Figure 4) were less likely in the 1980s for all groups. Only the college-educated had
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higher-than-average probabilities of moving out of low-income status. Being young lost its advantage in the 1980s, while blacks and female heads continued to be less likely to move into the
middle class.
Downward mobility from high to middle income became less frequent in the 1980s than
before. While all subgroups within the high-income class shared in this favorable development,
younger families continued to have a higher-than-average risk of falling into the middle (Figure 5).
The probability of falling from middle-income status--falling from grace--increased
significantly in the 1980s. Female heads and blacks maintained their already higher-than-average
probability of falling from the middle, while people with schooling beyond high school had lowerthan-average risks.
Whose Income Changed the Most?
As with poverty transitions (Bane and Ellwood, 1986), it is also useful to isolate in our set
of income transitions the income component that changed the most. We did this by calculating
for each of our transitions the dollar changes in the earnings of adult men and women and in the
income of other family members (principally older children). The component changing the most
was designated "most important," provided it accounted for at least half of the net change in total
income. If the most important income component failed to account for half of the net change,
then the given transition was assigned to an "other income" category.
The results, shown in Table 3, clearly point to the importance of men's earnings; it was the
most important income component in all four of the transitions, both before and after 1980.
Women's earnings figured more prominently in high-income transitions during the
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1980s, while the importance of the income of other adult family members declined for all four of
the transitions.
The lessening importance of other earners held in particular for transitions between
middle- and high-income status. Prior to the 1980s, increases in other family members' earnings
were more important than women's earnings in explaining transitions into high-income status;
after 1980 the relative importance of these two components reversed. Decreases in other family
members' earnings, often due to the nest-leaving departure of a young adult from the family home,
became less important in transitions from high- to middle-income status in the 1980s.
A more detailed look at the favorable transitions involving men's earnings (data not shown
in Table 3) showed that they were more often associated with higher rates of pay rather than
overtime hours or second jobs. Upward mobility linked to women's earnings was more evenly
split between increases in wage rates and in hours. Downward transitions for men were more
likely to result from changes in hours--job loss and unemployment--than declining rates of pay.
For women, decreases in both wages and hours are important in explaining why earned income
declined.
In general, our findings support those of Blackburn et al. (1991), Blank (1991), and
Danziger and Gottschalk (1991). The widening of the income distribution and the withering of
the middle class are mainly associated with growing inequality in men's earnings--in particular
wage changes. Women's earnings are of increasing importance in explaining movements from
middle to high income. However, men's earnings still figures most prominently in at least twice as
many transitions as do women's earnings.

25
The Role of Wealth
Our discussion thus far has focused almost entirely on income, taking wealth into account
only insofar as household incomes typically include very small amounts of income from wealth in
the form of interest, rent, and dividends. Our belief that accumulated wealth or, more precisely,
net worth constitutes a major difference between the lower, middle, and upper classes leads us to
investigate how taking wealth into account changes the income-based view chosen thus far. We
examine recent changes in the distribution of net worth, joint distribution of income and net
worth, and distribution of net worth among people making the kinds of income-based transitions
analyzed in the first part of the chapter. Our measure of net worth includes the value of housing
equity, other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses, stocks, savings and investments and other
assets, less other outstanding debt. Information on pension wealth was not available, and even if
it were, its illiquidity would lead us to treat it separately in our analyses.
The PSID contains only two waves with comprehensive wealth data--1984 and 1989.
Hence, we are limited to changes in net worth between the mid- and late 1980s--the period just
beyond the final income transition year (1986) used thus far in this paper. We drew a sample of
25- to 50-year-olds in 1984 for this analysis but were able only to use data on pre- rather than
post-tax household income for our income measure. Income transitions are measured by
averaging income over 1984 and 1985 to set initial position and 1987 and 1988 to set the final
income position.
Changes in the Size Distribution of Wealth and Income
We begin with comparative snapshots showing changes in the size distribution of net
worth between 1984 and 1989 (Table 4). In these two years the adults in our sample were
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ranked by net worth to determine the points separating the 20th, 50th, 80th, and 90th percentiles
of the wealth distribution. 12 Net worth at the 90th percentile was almost 40 times the net worth
of the 20th wealth percentile in each year. In contrast, the ratio of the 90th percentile of two-year
average incomes in 1984-85 to the 20th percentile was only 3.6. Thus, as has been shown with
numerous sets of data, net worth in the PSID in the late 1980s is much less equally distributed
than income.
The relative 90th to 20th percentile gap in net worth in 1989 was about the same as in
1984, suggesting that the 1984-1989 period was marked by roughly equal percentage gains at the
20th and 90th percentiles. Similar results have been recorded for the 1983-1986 period using the
Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances by Avery and Kennichell (1991).
Percentage gains in the middle were somewhat smaller. Of course, the dollar changes in wealth at
different points in the wealth distribution varied enormously, with the top decile gaining nearly
$114,000 between 1984 and 1989 and the bottom two deciles gaining less than $3,000.
As a second comparative cross-sectional tabulation, we ranked our prime-age adults
according to income rather than wealth and calculated average income and wealth at the 20th,
50th, and 90th percentiles of income (Table 5). 13 Not surprisingly, this ranking produces less
extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth, but even here wealth inequality reinforced income
inequality; the distribution of wealth is still significantly less equal than is the distribution of
income.
The ratio of the 90th to the 20th percentile of income rose from 3.6 to 3.8 over the
1984-1985 to 1987-1988 period, while the wealth ratios for these same people rose from 10.1 to
10.7. These increases imply that relative change at the upper end of the distribution (90th percentile) exceeded change at the lower end (20th percentile) in both absolute and percentage
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terms, producing a widening in the joint distribution. In other words, the group experiencing the
largest gains in income is also enjoying the most substantial gains in net worth. 14
Wealth Change Accompanying Income Transitions
Our final analysis combines income transitions with their concomitant wealth changes
(Table 6). Individuals were first classified according to the income transition they experienced
between 1984-1985 and 1987-1988. We then calculated median net worth, house equity as a
fraction of net worth and debt as a fraction of income in both 1984 and 1989 for each subgroup
defined by income change. 15
The results clearly show that changes in net worth and debt closely mirror changes in
income. Upwardly mobile individuals climbing into either the high- or middle-income class tended
to enjoy more favorable changes in wealth than did those with downward income-based transitions. The change in net worth for adults who persisted in the middle-income group (+$14,400)
was close to that of the entire sample (+$11,300, the row labelled "All" at the bottom of table).
High-income groups experienced large increases in net worth in both absolute and relative
terms. Moreover, the debt burden (relative to income) of those remaining in or climbing into the
high-income category fell slightly as did their ratio of housing equity to net worth. Hence, the
wealth gains for high-income, prime-age adults were largely in fungible nonhousing wealth, not in
home equity. Debt as a fraction of income remained constant for the middle-income group but
grew for people with low incomes. People climbing from low- to middle-income status (labelled
"climbed out of low" in the table) did relatively well, reducing their debt burden and enjoying the
largest percentage gain in net worth. (However, the dollar amount associated with this change
amounted to only $10,500.)
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Sample sizes of people remaining in the middle- and low-income categories were
sufficiently large to make possible separate estimates by race. Blacks had significantly lower net
worth in both periods. Middle-income blacks enjoyed larger percentage (but smaller absolute)
gains than did whites. People remaining in or falling into the low-income group did the worst,
posting declines in net worth of 16 and 44 percent, respectively. Among the low-income group,
only blacks experienced an increase in net worth--and then it was only $100. Median net worth
for those who continued to have low income fell by $600 ($3,700 to $3,100) over this period. In
contrast, it grew by $137,700 ($167,700 to $305,400) for individuals remaining in the highincome group. All in all, the addition of wealth dramatically reinforces our picture of increasing
income-based inequality.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The middle of the income distribution among prime-age adults in the United States has
indeed withered over the past decade. A middle-income adult's chances of falling from the middle
to the bottom of the distribution increasingly exceeded their chances of moving from the middle to
the top in the 1980s. If the seven percentage point decline in prime-aged adults from 1978-1979
to 1985-1986 continued until 1990, the middle-income group would constitute less than 65 and
closer to 60 percent of the population. We find that cyclical and demographic factors explain
little of the accelerated decline in the number of middle-income adults in the 1980s; all avenues of
transition out of the middle-income group were more heavily travelled during the past decade.
The withering of middle-income adult groups was marked by two major sets of forces: (1) the
upward movement of prime-age men and women who first experienced and then maintained large
real gains in their earnings during that period and (2) the stagnation of real earnings among
households in the low-income category. Wealth change in the latter 1980s clearly reinforced
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income change, particularly among individuals remaining in the high-income group and among
those moving from middle- to high-income status.
Other analyses based on cross-sectional data and microsimulation models (e.g., Michel,
1991; U.S. House of Representatives, 1991, Appendices I, J, K; and U.S. Congressional Budget
Office, 1991) confirm that the trends in our data continued through the late 1980s and are
projected to persist into the early 1990s. If anything, the Federal Tax Reform of 1986 solidified
the gains in after-tax income reached by the well-to-do (Pechman, 1990), while the analyses in
this paper indicate that the recession of 1990-1991 should reduce upward mobility from the
bottom while causing many of those most seriously affected to fall from middle-class status.
It appears then, that the 1980s and, according to some prognosticators (e.g., Reich, 1991),
the 1990s, as well, will constitute an epoch in American life that was quite different from the
post-war decades preceding it. Ours is a time marked by a significant increase in real income and
wealth for those with already high incomes and substantial wealth. Of course, this change alone is
one which policymakers should be most pleased with--if the trend was for upward mobility
throughout the distribution. But again, large sustained income gains are apparent only for the
yachts--not for the tugboats or the rowboats. When this upward mobility among the few is
coupled with the persistently high and stagnant poverty rates of American families with children
and the growing lack of upward mobility among our lower but still working class, a different
policy picture emerges. As the federal and state governments struggle to find funds to meet
growing needs for human and physical capital, for health, education and related program areas-funds to extend the chance for upward mobility to all income classes--we believe that we have
found a primary tax base to meet these revenue needs--the growing affluence of high-income,
middle-age Americans.

33
The policy discussions underlying the 1990 Deficit Reduction Act increasingly brought up
the question of "fairness" in the distributional effects of public tax and transfer policies at the
federal government level. These discussions brought policy changes which extended modest tax
relief and additional health care benefits to low-income families. Because this coming decade will
continue to be different from those that preceded it, we consider it vital to continue to re-examine
the federal income tax and to reconsider wealth taxation--in particular capital gains taxation of
wealth at time of death or transfer--as a source of funding to meet America's human resource
needs. Because the fruits of American economic growth are increasingly being concentrated
among the privileged 10 to 15 percent of the population at the top of the middle-age income and
wealth distribution, serious consideration should be given to modest sharing of this wealth, such
as those suggested by Downey and Gore (1991) and by the National Commission on Children
(see Steuerle and Jaffras, 1991) and their proposals to substitute a refundable child tax credit for
the children's personal exemption, to expand basic health and human capital programs to cover all
needy youth, and above all, to fund these expenditures via a modest increase in the top federal
income tax bracket (from 34 to 37 percent). The significant secular changes in the size
distribution of permanent income found in this paper make a strong case for the increased taxation
of high-income Americans as an answer to the oft heard question in Washington and in the state
capitals....."but where will we raise the money?"
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Appendix
Measures of Economic Status and Middle-Income Boundaries

Two important methodological issues arose in the transition analysis: (1) Should our
measure of household income adjust for differences in family size? and (2) What income levels
should define the boundaries of low-, middle-, and high-income groups across time?
Adjust Income for Family Size?
It is common practice in poverty research to adjust income for family size to produce an
income measure called "income-to-needs," usually obtained by dividing a household's income by
the U.S. government poverty threshold for the household's size. Well-being, it is argued, depends
both on resources (usually income) and on the number and characteristics of individuals who must
share those resources.
But what happens when we move beyond poverty to a study of middle- and high-income
status? On the one hand, it can be argued that middle-income status also depends on both income
and how that income is shared by the household. A household with two adults and an annual
income of $35,000 has more income per person than does a household receiving the same income
but consisting of two parents and two children. By this logic, a birth reduces well-being if it is not
associated with an increase in income and the movement of a child from this household to a
separate dwelling improves the well-being of the household left behind, so long as the departing
child has "eaten" more than he has earned.
However, others (e.g., Lambert, 1990; Fisher, 1987; Pollak and Wales, 1979) have argued
that at some point in the income distribution, households may choose to add voluntarily to their
"needs" via the birth (or adoption) of children. In such cases where children can clearly be
identified as what economists call "consumption goods," the addition of a child does not neces-
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sarily decrease economic well-being. Particularly in a study of transitions from middle to high
income, such adjustments to well-being can become arbitrary and misleading. Since we feel that
both arguments have merit, we use two kinds of income boundaries: adjusting and not adjusting
for family size. Size adjustments are accomplished by dividing income by the U.S. poverty line
and its implicit equivalence scale.
Defining Middle (Income) Class
Our search for upper and lower boundaries of "middle income" began with a review of
how several authors have defined the rich, affluent, well-to-do, upper class, etc., in recent studies
(Appendix Table A-1). Our choice of the boundary of "high income-to-needs" was 6.0 (i.e., six
times the poverty line). The "high-income" boundary was set at $55,000 (in 1987 dollars). These
cutoffs came from examining the distribution of two-year average income and income-to-needs,
expressed in 1987 dollars using the CPI-UX1, and the sample of adults (25-50) defined earlier.
Income trends produce changing numbers of adults above and below these boundaries, but in the
middle of the sample period (1977-1978) each of these measures left roughly 10 percent (in fact 9
percent) of adults with high incomes.
Following a similar procedure, we chose the 2.0 income-to-needs level and $18,500 (in
1987 dollars) as boundaries of the "low-income" groups. Each of these separated roughly the
bottom quintile (actually the 18th percentile) of the distributions in 1977-1978. The 2.0 level also
appeals to us because of the recent work of Holden and Smeeding (1990) and Scholz and
Maritato (1990), which used 2.0 as an income-to-needs level separating the economically
"insecure" and "secure." In addition, we felt that cyclicity of income and earnings movements
around the $20,000 threshold (e.g., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1989; Levy, 1987)
was an important phenomenon to capture in our analyses. Thus we arrived at our
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distributions of high- (6.0 and above; $55,000 and above), low- (below 2.0; below $18,500), and
middle-income (2.00 - 5.99; $18,500 - $55,000) groups.
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Endnotes
1.

As explained below, as of late 1990, a consistent time series on post-tax household income
is possible in the PSID only for calendar years 1967-1986. Incomes for 1987 and 1988 are
used only in the wealth section of the chapter.

2.

We also experimented with a transition measure that required household income to be in the
low-, middle-, and high-income categories for both the first and second or both fourth an d
fifth years. This restriction yielded presumably more reliable but fewer transitions and did not
fundamentally alter the conclusions of our analysis.

3.

An alternative approach to the definition of boundaries, suggested by Peter Gottschalk, was
to define the upper and lower bounds of the middle class at the same percentile points of the
income distribution each year. We implemented this completely relative definition by setting
the high income line in each year at the 90th percentile and the lower bound of the middl e
class at the 20th percentile. With one minor exception (noted below), the results using this
approach were very similar to those using the absolute approach.

4.

As documented by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (1990), the 1989 CPS dat a
show an all-time high share of aggregate income for the top quintile and ventile and all-time
lows for the bottom two quintiles. The middle three-fifths of the family income distribution
in 1989 received the lowest income share recorded by the Census since 1947, only 50. 8
percent of total CPS money incom e, while the top fifth of families shared 44.6 percent of the
total--their largest share ever recorded.

5.

The comparable fractions of adults making the four transitions involving income-to-needs are
7.7, 27.5, 31.8, and 6.8 percent, respectively.

6.

In calculating trends in disposable personal income per capita over each five-year period, we
regressed the natural logarithm of the per capita personal income measure on the calenda r
year. The slope of the regr ession line has the interpretation as the average annual percentage
growth. This produced a set of middle years--1974, 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1981--with
economic growth that was much below average.

7.

Transitions based on income-to-needs showed very similar calendar-year patterns, as di d
transitions based on the completely relative definition of economic status. The singl e
exception was that transitions into the high-income group (top 9 percent) were no mor e
prevalent in the 1980s than before. We suspect that these differences are due to the fact that
the top 9 percent had incomes that were growing so fast that they succeeded in pulling the
lower boundary of the top income group up as fast as the incomes of those who woul d
otherwise have joined the group. Hence, the extent of movement up the distribution was no
greater in the 1980s than before. A look at the inflation-adjusted dollar changes in income
among adults grouped near the high-income cutoff point (e.g., $50,000-$55,000, $55,000$60,000, etc.) showed all of the medians to be larger in the 1980s than before.

8.

In contrast to the other transition based tables, the transitions in Table 2 are based on the 'both
year' definition of income that required family income to be in a given income status in both
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years 1 and 2 or 4 and 5.
9.

For example, in the analysis of transitions from middle- into high-income status, a person with
an initial two-year average household income of $27,500 would have an income that was 50
percent of the $55,000 transition line. In each set of regressions we expressed the distances
to the transition lines as a set of dummy variables based on quintiles of the sample at risk of
making the given transition. The exact regression results are available from the authors upon
request.

10.

If the entire income distribution were moving closer to the upper boundary of the middle income group, then the typical person "at risk" of making a transition into the upper-income
group wou ld be closer to the boundary after 1980 than before. Our dummy variable s
measuring a person's distance to the transition boundary adjust for this differential risk.

11.

We calculated the effect of each demographic characteristic by estimating a regression adjusted difference between the given demographic group and overall sample average. W e
then converted the logistic difference into an adjusted probability using the formula: P s = P b
e x / [(1-Pb) + Pb e x] where P s is the adjusted transition probability, Pb is the overall sample
probability, is the logistic regression coefficient of interest, and x is the change in the
independent variable of interest.

12.

Recall that we used roughly the 20th and 90th percentiles of the income distribution to define
the boundaries of our middle-income group.

13.

To determine pre-tax income cutoffs for the 1984-1988 period, we inflated the $18,500 and
$55,000 amounts to 1984-1988 levels using the CPI-UX1 and further increased thes e
amounts by the average gap between pre- and post-tax income for households in 1984 with
post-tax income around $18,500 and $55,000.

14.

Another way to integra te wealth into our income-based analysis of inequality is to substitute
for reported property income (i.e., rent, dividends and interest) an imputed return on ne t
wealth and to recalculate changes in the size of the low-, middle-, and high-income groups
based on this expanded definition of wealth. We also compared income transitions based on
the two al ternative treatments of income from wealth. Virtually never were favorabl e
transitions based on one income definition accompanied by unfavorable transitions based on
the other definition.
Using pre-tax income levels of $70,263 and $21,316 in 1987 dollars as boundaries of the
middle-income group, we applied the rate of return on U.S. government long-term bonds to
net worth to obtain our alternative measure of income from wealth. With these boundaries,
the group of middle-income adults shrank in size between 1984-1985 and 1987-1988 from
67.8 to 64.3 percent, but so did the lowe r-income group, from 18.9 to 16.4 percent. The big
gainer was the high-income group, which grew from 13.2 to 19.1 percent.

15.

In calculating house equity as a fraction of net worth and debt as a fraction of income, w e
took all individuals between the 25th and 75th percentiles and then found the mean of these
ratios across these sets of individuals. Sample sizes for the "fell from high income" group were

40
sufficiently small that we took all such individuals in making the mean ratio calculations.
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